Pre-disable v3 checkpoint, sealed before key disable

The key is gone. Deployment continued without it.

A fresh disposable key completed its legacy baseline, ProofV2, the WIF cutover, and all eight hostile denials. Its archive checkpoint was reviewed and merged while the key was still live, a human disabled the key, and a fresh attempt to authenticate with it was refused by Google. Certifying the post-disable deployment needs one more transaction on the corrected audit checks; the disabled key is never re-enabled to attempt it.

Gemini interprets.Deterministic code proves. Humans authorize. Missing evidence stops the workflow.
Gemini 3.5Reads evidence
Google ADKAgent runtime
Cloud RunDeploy target
GitHub ActionsIdentity + CI
Workload IdentityNo stored key
FirestoreReplay defence
Cloud KMSReceipt signing
Cloud Audit LogsIndependent proof
12/12supported cases
4/4safe refusals
8/8recoveries
72/72schema-valid calls
Authoritative sequence

Cutover gates

  1. 01 Legacy baselinekeyless-demo-legacy-3 historical
  2. 02 WIF trust read-backNo downstream permission added in the recorded run historical
  3. 03 ProofV2 replayReviewed run 32761994628; consumed once; replay rejected historical
  4. 04 Gemini necessitySealed release evaluation passed passed
  5. 05 H1 foreign ownerGitHub run 32765012489 historical
  6. 06 H2 wrong repositoryGitHub run 32765014617 historical
  7. 07 H3–H8 controlsSix intended controls reached and denied historical
  8. 08 Human key disableKey 1f0137c50d534e23c58e2ae0f84ccf3a9847351d; actor yashwanth.surabhi@gmail.com historical
  9. 09 Canonical pre-disable archive checkpointReviewed and merged (PR #35) before key disable passed
  10. 10 Fresh disposable v3 transactionPre-disable half complete through key disable; wif-2 continuity permanently blocked by an audit-log collision on this repository blocked
Fail-closed state

What still blocks release

  • WIF-2 continuity cannot be produced on this repository: H6 and H8's audit-log entries are indistinguishable from deploy's own exchange, so no query can isolate a clean two-entry evidence window.
  • Gating the hostile jobs to fix that collision changes the workflow's bytes, which breaks the wif_1 blob-SHA pin that legacy_baseline validation requires.
  • The disabled key must never be re-enabled to attempt continuity; this transaction's evidence stands as pre-disable v3 completion only.
Reconstructable proof

External sources

Checkpoint SHA-256
21bef8d2a9dab2f95ad767e26a0a2e3b1c9c36a9e38ed1b92c4ed3f59064007b